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12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samav�ya, there results a regressus in infinitum from equality.
The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samav�ya.--Why so?--Because the samav�ya also, like part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing to establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain. The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samav�ya relation, defining it as 'that connexion which is the cause of the idea "this is here," in the case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now, if such a samav�ya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact that things observed to be inseparably connected--as, e.g., class characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which they belong--are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to be searched for why the samav�ya, which is of the same nature as those things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further reason has to be postulated, and so on, in infinitum.
Nor can it be said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the essential nature of samav�ya (so that no further reason need be demanded for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities, and so on (which would render the assumption of a samav�ya needless for them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen entity such as the samav�ya is, and then to assume for it such and such an essential nature.--These objections apply to the samav�ya whether it be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next S�tra urges a further objection against it if viewed as eternal.
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